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The paper presents the results of a focused effort perfonned by the members of the Space 
Propulsion Synergy Team (SPST) Functional Requirements Sub-team to develop propulsion data 
to support Advanced Technology Lifecycle Analysis System (ATLAS). This is a spreadsheet 
application to analyze the impact of technology decisions at a system-of-systems level. Results 
are summarized in an Excel workbook we call the Technology Tool Box (TIB). The TIB 
provides data for technology perfonnance, operations, and programmatic parameters in the fonn 
ofa library of technical infonnation to support analysis tools and/or models. The lifecycle of 
technologies can be analyzed from this data and particularly useful for system operations 
involving long running missions. The propulsion technologies in this paper are listed against 
Chemical Rocket Engines in a Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) fonnat. 
The overall effort involved establishing four elements: 
(I) A general purpose Functional System Breakdown Structure (FSBS). 
(2) Operational Requirements for Rocket Engines. 
(3) Technology Metric Values associated with Operating Systems 
(4) Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) of Chemical Rocket Engines 
The list of Chemical Rocket Engines identified in the WBS is by no means complete. It is 
planned to update the TTB with a more complete list of available Chemical Rocket Engines for 
United States (US) engines and add the Foreign rocket engines to the WBS which are avai lable 
to NASA and the Aerospace Industry. 
The Operational Technology Metric Values were derived by the SPST Sub-team in the 
fonn of the TIB and establishes a database for users to help evaluate and establish the 
technology level of each Chemical Rocket Engine in the database. The Technology Metric 
Values will serve as a guide to help detennine which rocket engine to invest technology money 
in for future development. 
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Nomenclature 
= Advanced Technology Lifecycle Analysis System 
= AIliant Techsysterns 
= Command and Control 
= Chemical Propulsion lnfonnation Agency 
= Engine Control Unit 
= Engine Interface Unit 
= Earth-toOrbit 
= Functional System Breakdown Structure 
= Gas Generator 
= Gaseous Helium 
= Gaseous Nitrogen 
= Hydrocarbon 
= Human and Robotic Technology 
= Interface Control Document 
= Integrated Electronic Assemblies 
= Life Cycle Cost 
= Liquid Hydrogen 
= Liquid Oxygen 
= Liquid Oxygen 
= Life Cycle Cost 
= Launch Escape System 
= Lunar Module 
= Mobile Launch Platfonn 
= Measurable Operational Functional Criteria Discriminators 
= National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
= Operationally Efficient Propulsion System Study 
= Operational Difficulty Factor 
= Operations and Maintenance Requirements Specification 
= Operations Reliability Factor 
= Oxidizer 
= Quality Function Deployment 
= Rocket Based Combined Cycle 
= Radial Outward Firing Initiator 
= Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor 
= Range Safety System 
= Space Propulsion Synergy Team 
= Solid Rocket Motor 
= Space Shuttle Main Engine 
= Technical Performance Metric 
= Technology Tool Box 
= Thrust Vector Control 
= United States 
= Work Breakdown Structure 
Introduction 
In 2004 NASA was developing an "Advanced Technology LifecycIe Analysis System" 
(ATLAS), which was a spreadsheet application to analyze the impact of technology decisions at 
a system-of-systems level. At the heart of this ATLAS is an Excel workbook known as the 
"Technology Tool Box" (TIB). The TIB provides data for technology performance, operations, 
sand programmatic parameters used by models in the ATLAS library. As emphasized in the 
name, the models in ATLAS address the lifecycIe of technologies. 
In support of the development of Operational Technologies and the development of 
Technology Metric Values for the ATLAS TIB, the SPST was requested to provide the 
development of Operational Metrics. In response to this request, the SPST developed the 
Operations Difficulty Factor (ODF) and an Operations Reliability Factor (ORF) for 
incorporation in the ATLAS TIB database for the first 3 year incremental time frame of 2005--
2008 of an intended eleven time frames in the future through the year 2038. 
To accomplish the development of these ODFs and ORFs, the SPST first identified 
Measurable Operational Functional Criteria Discriminators that could be used to develop the 
Operational Metric Values in the TIB. The process desired was to select a reference technology 
choice for each technology class and by comparing the technology choices against this reference 
considering a range of 1.0 to 10. Thus, an order of magnitude from better to worse, setting the 
reference value at 1.0 and the range for better would be 0. 1 to 1.0 and the range for worse would 
be 1.0 to 10. 
The TIB was conceived to support development of technologies starting with incremental 
time frames 2005- 2008, 2008 - 20 II , etc, for each of the technology options considering 
technology maturation advancement for each period. 
The SPST worked two classes of Chemical Rocket Engines, WBS 2.6. 1 Earth-to-Orbit (ETO) 
Propulsion Technology sub-element and WBS 2.6.5 In-space Propulsion (chemicallthennal) 
Technical sub-element. 
The Operational Technology Metric Values derived by the SPST would be used by the 
ATLAS database users and modelers to help evaluate and establish the technology level of each 
Chemical Rocket Engine in the database. The Technology Metric Values were included in a 
Technology Investment Portfolio to serve as a guide to detennine which technology would gain 
the greatest operational improvement for out year investments . 
Methodology 
The process selected by the SPST considered 16 different propulsion system in the ETO class 
eWBS 2.6.1) and 13 different propulsion systems in the In-space class (WBS 2.6.5) for 
evaluation. Some of these propulsion systems were well establi shed operational systems and 
others were either less mature or notional systems. The SPST had perfonned a QFD in previous 
studies that had identi fied many design discriminators against the desired attributes for an 
affordable/sustainable space transportation system. These design discriminators were arranged in 
an order of importance and the top applicable Measurab le Operational Functional Criteria 
Discriminators (MOFCD) were used to perfonn the evaluation of the selected propulsion 
systems to detennine their ODF and used to perfonn the evaluation of these propulsion systems 
ORF. 
One additional criterion was added that detennined the maturity (a well documented 
operational definition of discriminator data) for evaluation and understanding. This criteria was 
evaluated on the basis of a I (well defined), 3 (somewhat defined), and a 9 (not well defined at 
all). This added criterion would add a burden to those systems that were not mature, but could be 
removed when these technologies were developed and demonstrated as being mature. This 
allows for selection of future systems for development that show promise in reaching the 
objective of being more affordable than the present system being used today. Future time frame 
evaluations would take into account the advances made to mature technology propulsion 
systems. At this time frame the criterion that was added for the evaluation of this maturity would 
be reduced; therefore, the raw score for that technology would be reduced from the previous time 
frame yielding a lower ODF and a new ORF. 
It was found that only 28 criteria were evaluated out of a larger group as data was missing in 
the others which were evaluated with a score of 0 or left blank. This evaluation was perfonned 
using a matrix that allowed the evaluation of each propulsion system against each Measurable 
Operational Functional Criteria Discriminators with the SSME being selected as the reference 
case for the ETO class and the RL- I 0 A-4 selected as the reference case for the In-space class. 
Each propulsion system was evaluated and the scores were added to determine the raw score of 
each. Each raw score was then normalized against the reference case, e.g. , the ODF and ORF and 
transferred to the ATLAS TIB. 
Operational Analysis Results (grouped in three categories) 
(I) A general purpose Functional System Breakdown Structure (FSBS). 
(2) Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) of Chemical Rocket Engines 
(3) Technology Metric Values associated with Operating Systems 
l. General Purpose Functional System Breakdown Structure (FSBS): 
This generic FSBS (a product of a previous study effort that was discontinued) was requested 
by our customer as a part of this task. The generic FSBS was developed to provide the capability 
to analyze technologies within the existing TIB, and would also reflect the Advanced Systems 
Technology Research and Analysis WBS. 
To develop a generic FSBS applicable to all phases and missions of a Space Transportation 
System, the SPST Sub-team reviewed past Space Transportation Systems and their WBSs, many 
of which have been used for 50 plus years. A generic FSBS was developed that is applicable to 
any Space Transportation System (flight system, ground system and ground functional nodes in 
space or on other planets). 
2. Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) of Chemical Rocket Engines 
Operational Discriminators and the development of Technology Metric Values for 
Technologies were defined by reviewing the Chemical Rocket Engines within the ATLAS data 
base to determine their technology levels for potential Development Technologies to be included 
in the Human and Robotic Technology (H&RT)'s technology Investment Portfolio. The H&RT 
requested the SPST Functional Requirements Sub-team to develop the Operational Metrics for 
the ATLAS TIB. When reviewing the Chemical Rocket Engines in the existing WBS, it became 
obvious that the list of available Chemical Rocket Engines, both United States (US) and foreign 
needed to be up-dated to provide a complete-as-possible listing of Chemical Rocket Engines that 
are or could be avai lable to NASA and the Aerospace Industry. 
The WBS 2.6.1 for ETO rocket engines lists thirteen rocket engines, two rocket motors and 
one propulsion technology. Seven are qualified Liquid Rocket Engines, but only five are still 
flying; the SSME, RS68, RS27 A from the US, the HM 60 from France, and the RD180 from 
Russia. There are two qualified Solid Rocket Motors ' the Apollo LES (retired) and the RSRM 
still flying both from the US . The RD 170 was in the WBS listing, but is no longer in production; 
therefore, the SPST Sub-team replaced it with the RD 173 ETO technology engine, and is 
identified by a 3 in the fifth digit of the WBS as shown in Table 1.0 below. 
WBS 2.6.1 -- ETO Propulsion 
WBS 2.6.1.1.2 - SSME - Reference Engine 
WBS 2.6.1.1.1 - RS68 - Qualified Engine 
WBS 2.6. 1.1 .3 - HM60 - Qualified Engine 
WBS 2.6.1.1.4 - F-I - Retired Engine 
WBS 2.6. 1.1.5 - )·2 - Retired Engine 
WBS 2.6.1.3 .1 - RBCC - Technology Engine 
WBS 2.6.1.3.2 - Linear Aerospike Technology Engine 
WBS 2.6.1.3.3 - Annular Aerospike Technology Engine 
WBS 2.6.1.5.1 - Solid/Hybrid - Technology Engine 
WBS 2.6.1.5.2 - RSRM - Qualified Propulsion 
WBS 2.6.1.5.3 - Apollo LES Retired Propulsion 
WBS 2.6.1.6. 1 - RSn - Technology Engine 
WBS 2.6.1.6.2 - RS27 A - Qualified Engine 
WBS 2.6. 1.6.3 - RD 173 - Technology Engine 
WBS 2.6.1.6.4 - RD 180 - Qualified Engine 
WBS 2.6.1.8.1 - MGLV - Concept Technology Propulsion 
us 
US 
France 
US 
US 
US 
US 
US 
US 
US 
US 
US/German 
US 
Russia 
Russia 
US 
Table 1.0 - WBS 2.6.1 ETO Engines/Propulsion evaluated by the SPST Sub-Team 
WBS 2.6.5 for In-space rocket engines identifies eleven rocket engines, one rocket motor and 
one propulsion technology. Five are qualified Liquid Rocket Engines, but only one is still flying; 
the RL 1 OA-4. The Chemical PropUlsion Information Agency's (CPIA) rocket engine database 
shows the RLIOA-4 and not the RLIOA-6 as a viable rocket engine. Therefore, the RLlOA-6 
was replaced with the RLI OA-4 engine in the database. The Solid/Hybrid technology motor was 
added to the WBS. The RS27A derivative technology engine was added in place of the "No-
name LOx/HC" engine. The MB60, the RL60, the Apollo LM Descent, the RS72, the 
SolidlHybrid, the OEPSS Concept, and the MOLY Concept Technologies were added and 
identified by an X in the fifth digit of the WBS number as shown in Table 2.0 below. 
WBS 2.6.5 - In-space Propulsion 
WBS 2.6.5. 1.1 - RLI OA-4 - Reference Engine 
WBS 2.6.5. I.X - MB60 - Technology Engine 
WBS 2.6.5.I .X - RL60 - Technology Engine 
WBS 2.6.5.1.2 - HM 60 Derivative - Technology Engine 
WBS 2.6.5.1.3 - J-2 Retired Engine 
WBS 2.6.5 .1.5 - Apollo CSM SPS - Retired Engine 
WBS 2.6.5.1.6 - Apollo LM Ascent - Retired Engine 
WBS 2.6.5.I.X - Apollo LM Descent - Retired Engine 
WBS 2.6.5.2.1 - RS27 A Derivative - Teclmology Engine 
WBS 2.6.5.8.X - RSn - Teclmology Engine 
WBS 2.6.5.8.X - SolidlHybrid - Technology Motor 
WBS 2.6.5.X.x - OEPSS Concept - Technology Engine 
WBS 2.6.5.X .X - MGLV Concept Technology Propulsion 
us 
US 
US 
France 
US 
US 
US 
US 
US 
US/Geml3n 
US 
US 
US 
Table 2.0 - WBS 2.6.5 In-space Engines evaluated by the SPST Sub-Team 
The SPST Sub-team selected the SSME as the reference ETO engine and all technology 
ETO propulsion systems were compared to the SSME. For the In-space rocket engines, the 
RLI OA-4 was selected as the reference engine and all In-space technology propulsion systems 
were compared to the RLIOA-4. 
(3) Technology Metric Values associated with Operating Systems 
In defining a process that could work with multiple objective attributes, the SPST performed a 
QFD exercise. This process was accomplished in previous studies that had identified the many 
design drivers that were responsive to the attributes of an affordable / sustainable space 
transportation system. These design drivers are sometimes referred to as "technical performance 
metrics" (TPMs); however, in this paper they will be referred to as "operational functional 
criteria discriminators". These operational design discriminators were arranged in an order of 
importance and the top applicable 48 measurable operational functional criteria discriminators 
were used to perform the evaluation of the selected propulsion systems to determine their ODF 
and the top applicable 48 measurable operational functional criteria discriminators were used to 
perform the evaluation of these propulsion systems ORF. 
Forty-eight Operational Discriminators were used to evaluate the one reference engine and the 
all the other engines/propulsion systems in the WBS 2.6. I ETO Propulsion shown in Table 1.0 
above. Establishing the SSME as the reference ETO engine with a nominal value of 1.0, and 
comparing the technology and other engines/propulsion systems on a scale of O. I to 10; with 0.1 
being an order-of-magnitude better and 10 being an order-of-magnitude worse than the SSME, 
provided the SPST Sub-team with a structured methodology and technique to derive Technology 
Metric Values for each Operational Discriminator for each rocket engine/propulsion concept 
evaluated. 
Forty-eight Operational Discriminators were also used to evaluate the one reference 
engine and all the other engines/propulsion systems in the WBS 2.6.5 In-space Propulsion shown 
in Table 2.0 above. Establishing the RLI OA-4 as the reference In-space engine with a nominal 
value of 1.0, and comparing the technology and other engines/propulsion systems on a scale of 
0.1 to 10; with 0.1 being an order-of-magnitude better and 10 being an order-of-magnitude worse 
than the RLI OA-4, provided the SPST Sub-team with a structured methodology and technique to 
derive the Technology Metric Values for each Operational Discriminator for each engine 
evaluated concept evaluated. 
Because there wasn ' t data for all the 48 measurable operational functional criteria 
discriminators, only 28 criteria are presented in this technical paper as being used to evaluate the 
propulsion technologies for both the ETO and the In-Space WBS groups. For definition of the 28 
measurable operational functional criteria discriminators use, please see the "evaluation products 
examples" that follow. 
One additional criterion was added that determined the maturity (well documented operational 
definition of these discriminator data) for evaluation and understanding. This criteria was 
evaluated on the basis of a I (well defined), 3 (somewhat defined), and a 9 (not well defined at 
all). This added criterion would add a burden to those systems that were not mature, but could be 
removed when these technologies were developed and demonstrated as being mature. This 
allows for selection of future systems for development that show promise in reaching the 
objective of being more affordable that the present system being used today. Future time frame 
evaluations would take into account the advances made to mature technology propulsion 
systems. At this time frame the criterion that was added for the evaluation of this maturity would 
be reduced; therefore, the raw score for that technology would be reduced from the previous time 
frame yielding a lower ODF and a new ORF. 
Evaluation Product Examples 
The SPST only preformed the first year 2005 evaluation for these selected systems. In addition 
to evaluating the gains from maturing an advanced design, it can be seen that if a mission 
requires large thrust values the ODF must be compared with multiples of smaller propulsion 
systems. Therefore, from a total systems perspective even though the ODF is larger than that of 
another system, it may be the desired choice. 
The following three examples for ETO (WBS 2.6.1) show that with all systems being mature, 
the SRM has much higher thrust than the other two cases; therefore, if it was replace with 
another choice, it needs to be relatively close to the SRM 's thrust level. The ODF and ORF 
would not be desirable for the reference system if it required 5-6 units to match the desired 
required equivalent thrust. 
These example propulsion system evaluations make it clear which Operational Discriminators 
are candidates for improvement ifit is desired to improve the operability of any of these mature 
technologies. 
Ref Technology 
Criteria RS 68 L02l'lHz 2.6.1.1.1 (Operattonal Criteria Shuttle SRM Solid 2.6.1.52 Criteria Criteria Discriminators (SSME) LOilHz 2.6.1.12 Value Value Value Factor Rockeldyne Engine) Faclor (Operalxmal ATK Motor) Factor (Operational Rockeldyne Engine) 
1. Closed Compartments/Confined Not Rockel Engine Focused N/' Not Rocket Engine Focused N/' Nol Rockel Engine Focused N/A 
2. Number of Differenl Operating LH1, LOz, GNz, GHe, 83282 Hydraulic Oil 5 LHz, LOz, GHe, 83282 Hydrau lic Oil 4 0.8 GN2 02 Fluids Serviced: 
5 Post.flighl GNzdrying purges & 2 Pre· T..{I umbililcal al the MLP/Aft to provide 
3. Number of Ground Servicing 
flight GHe, Heated GNz conditioning GHe spin start & GHe purges 2 029 joinl heater powerftemperature 2 029 Inlerfaces: control & aft skirt healed purge to 
purges provide Rex joint temp control. 
4. Total NumberofTanksln the 10 GHe Botties , 4 Hydraulic 16 Lox & LH2 lanks, sn He boHles thai 9 0~6 1 pressure vessel with 4 RSRM 0.1 Architecture: Containers,lH2 & l02 Tanks are thrust dependent (Heavy @7) segments with 7 pints 
lH2 tank & feed-system, l02 tank & 
feed-system, He pneumatic supply sys, lH2 tank & feed-system,102 tank & 
Heated GN2 purge sys, Lox anti- feed-system, He pneumatic supply 
geysering sys, 002 tank sys, lox anti-geysering sys, 002 tank 
pressurization ays, GH2 tank pressurization sys, GH2 tank Range Safety Sys, Pyrotechnic noule 
pressurization sys, POGO suppression pressurization sys, POGO separation sys, 2 Ignition Firing Sys , 
5. Total Number of Vehicle sys, Two hydrlullc supply sys, lH2 26 suppression sys, hydraulic supply 24 0.92 TVC sys , FourTVC controllers, Two 14 0.54 Support Systems: rec irculation conditioning sys, l02 sys,lH2 bleed conditioning sys, lO2 28vott power supply sys, 
bleed conditioning sys, TVC sys, Four bleed conditioning sys, 3 TVC sys, instrumentation interface sys, Two 
TVC controllers, Two 2avolt power TVC controllers , Two 2avoll power Integrated Electronic Assemblies (lEA) 
supply sys, Two 400cycle AC power supply sys, Two 400cycle AC power 
supply sys, Three Vehicle C&C (EIU) supply sys , Instrumentation Interface 
sys, Instrumentation interface sys , & sys , & TPS heat shield 
TPS heat shield 
Source ls the Design Ref.Doc. ICD's, 
Source is the Design Ref.Doc. ICD's, 
Source is the Design Ref.Doc. ICD's 6. Total NumberofGround Includ ing noula, 2 exhaust and 5 
Interface Functions Required : e.g., tesl ports, noule coyers, 25 drain line coyers, 2 TP inspection 13 0~2 leak tesl ports (12),joinl heaters · 21 0.84 inspection Inlerface points. ports , 2 GG pyro igniters , ROFI power & monitoring (9) 
7. Total Number of Separate 
Identified Vehicle Systems (lack of Not Rocket Engine Focused N/A Not Rocket Engine Focused N/A Nol Rocket Motor Focused N/A 
discipline funcbonallntegration): 
2 GG pyro igniters, ancillary Yatves 
switch position , TVC11R01l Control 
a. Number of Separate Noule pm.ary and complementary, 
Electrica~lectronic Inlerfaces: Please aee eleclricallisting in item 19 12 TVC2 primary and complementary, 2 16 U3 Please see electrical listing in item 19 1.91 power supply channels to ECU, 6 
Instrumentation, ROFI for main 
combustion chamber 
(18) Mech & (23) EIe: (4) Motor 
segment mating, (3) leak check 
segmenllsegment joints, mating to aft. 
Skirt, mating 10 nonie, Ie.k check 
(12) Mech & (12) EIe: lHz & lOz (16) ele & (22) mech: pump inlets, Olt nonle joint, mate S&A le.k Check 
feed lines, GHz & Go, presslines, GHe & bleed, ox dome purge, lnler Propell.nt (3) aft structural struts to ET, male 
Seal (IPS), Olt & fuel lank pressurants, fOlWard structural attachment to ET, 
GNz Supply Hnes, Hydraulic Supply & GG fuel purge, fuel sys purge, GG Olt anach (2) TVC actuators, instal 
9. Number of Mechanical Element Return lines,lH2 Condition ing purge, 2 TVC hydraulic supply & electrical tunnel, mate (2) electrical 
Mating Operations: Bleed line, Glmbleblock & (2)TVC 24 return, bleed vatve actuation , fuel 38 '.50 cables 10 igniters, mate electrical 43 1.79 
Actuators and (2)AC & (2)DC power, (2) bleed, Fuel BIeed·Drain/Diverter Vatve, cables to instrumentation, mate 
CommandlOata, a Command only, barrier purge, 4 structural anach electrical cables to safe & ann device 
main fuel valve healer& (4) points, spin start, hydraulic turbine for Range Safety sys, (2) TVC actuator 
Instrumentation Electrical Connectors elthaust ele connections, (8) ele. connectors to 
joint heaters and to ground Interface 
per motor, (8) ele. connectors 10 joint 
heater instrumentation and to ground 
interface per motor 
High pressure bonles must be vented Safe the ignition sys, inspect the 10. Number of Saring Operations Safe the GG igniter sys & vent high pyrotechnic nonle separation sys, 
at landIng: to 50% level before personnel pressure bonles to 50% level 2 2 safe the range safety sys, remove and • • 
exposure. 
dispose RSS 
(5) motor major compon.nt 
inspections and handlIng , (7) 
11 . Number of Safety Driven 
Engine Handling, Inert Purging , Engine Handling,lnert Purg ing, structural element mating limited Access Control Pressuriting to Flight Values 3 Pressurtling to Flight Values, & ROFI • 1.33 operations/motor, installation of 16 5.33 Operations : Installation ignition Safe & Ann Device, 
Installation of range safety ordnance, 
ordnance electrical connections 
12. Number of Commodities used Working with Inert gases, in conflned Working with inert gases , in confined All Solid Rocket handling oper.Uons, 
that Require Medical Support spaces, and with cryogenics requires 3 spaces, and with cryogenics requires 3 aJi ordnance device handling 3 
Operations or Routine Training: special training . special training. operations, with Inert gases 
Main fuel valve, Main lox vatve, Ox 
Preburner Iolt supply valve, Fuel 
prebumer lox supply valve, Heated 
GN2 purge valve, lolt dome purge 
vatve, Fuel coolant supply valve, Fuel 
Flex nonie, Safe & Arm dev ice for 
coolant syst.m He purge valve, High Fuel pump, lOX pump, 4 main vatves, motor ignition, and Safe, noule 13. Total Numberof Active pressure lox turbopump, low pressure 
Components : lox turbopump, High pressure fuel 33 3 bleed valves, 1 FOOV, 9 check 22 0.67 separatkln syS & Safe, Ann device for 6 0.18 
turbopump, low pressure fuel vatves, & 3 TVC actuators the Range Safety sys, and (2) TVC 
turbo pump, Pneu shutdown supply gimbal actuators 
valve, Flow meter, Six augmented 
spark igniters , (2) TVC actuators, 
POGO & fIVe propeRant vatve solenoids 
and rIVe check valves 
14. NumberofSafety Driven L02 antigysering. cryo-
Safety Functional Requirements conditioninglbleed fo~ en~ . S~rt (Lox & Haz gas system. engine cryo Nozzle separation device during 
to Maintain Safe Control of System Fuel). pogo suppressIOn. ignitIOn over· 9 conditioning. IPS purge. barrier 7 0.78 descent, Range safety distruction sys 3 0.33 
during Flight and Ground pressure, safety purges for start & purges. pre-start purges, MECO & safe & arm dev ice for ignition sys 
Operations : shutdown, Ignition, pneumatic purge, & L02 antigyserlng 
shutdown & Lox turbopump seal 
15. Number of Critical· 1 (Crit.l) Source Is the Design Ref. For Crit 1 & 550Crtt & lRwith Source Is the Design Ref. ForCrit 1 & 141Crtl&IR 
System Functional Failure 1 R Hardware Items & the USA report 3t3Crtl&237Crt FMECA 234 OA3 lR Hardware Items & the USA report with 90 Crt t & 010 
Modes: 912812004 tR per engine 912812004 OMRSD File V Vol 1 StiR per molor 
10 Temperature, 19 Pressure, 1 Flow· 
rate, Lox anti..flood valve sensor, S 
16. Number of Intrusive Data propellant flow control valves sensors, Pressure & temp sensors 03. pressure sensors (Operational 3 Gathering Devices: Lox reclre. lsolation valve sensor, Lox 45 16 pressure transducer, OPT) 0.1 
and fuel bleed vatve sensors, & 6 
igniter sensors Instrumentation 
(Salvage & reuse) Must recover from ATK@Utah, 
17. Number of Maintenance Source Is the Design Ref.Doc. Of ocean, rough cilln motor, dissemble, HG-AF, ARF 
buildup, RPSF Actions Planned Between Operations and Maintenance -112 NIA NIA return to ma nut.cture for relo.d, .nd 
- 132 tasks & 2.64 Missions : Requirements SpecifICation (OMRS) totally rebuild both at manufacture 
MLP - 1&4 
and launch site for nexl flight lasks 
18. Number of Maintenance 
Source Is the Problem Reporting and 
Varies between missions, but It Is Corrective Action (PRACA) & Planning 
Actions Unplanned Between 
and Scheduling Sys (CAPSS) As-run - 2' NIA NIA suggested .ome rewof1( of assembly TBD 
Missions: 
D,'" 
of motor 
Source Is the Design Ref.Doc. Of 8 starts Designed for 20 flights, but 20 flights 19. Expected Operational Lifetime • Operations and Maintenance 30 starts115,000 PIOS I 1,200 3.75 splashdown loads vary from flight to (starts)@I22 1.5 Firings: Sec. flight causing a periodic loss of aft Requirements SpecifICation (OMRS) sec. 
segment sec each 
20. Expected Reusability-Humber Source Is the Design Ref.Dcc . Of Expendable engine ; however, 
of Firings Before Over-Haul: Operat;ons and Maintenance 20 certifICation was for 12 starts and 1800 TBD Complete Refurb each flight 10 
Requ irements SpecifICation (OMRS) sec 
Source Is the Problem Reporting and Major components are reusable , small 
21 . Expected Reusability (% HIW Corrective Action (PRACA)& Planning 
less than 1% NIA NIA parts/ non-conflgured items are 60 - 90% 10 Repllced per Firing): and Scheduling Sys (CAPSS) As-run 
typlc.11y not 
D", 
The intended reusable aspect of the 
motor is 20 f1ights @ l22seceach 
Source Is the Design Ref.Doc . Of ~" and remainder b expendable less than 1 hour 22. Expected Operation.'Llfelime • Operations and Maintenance 
- 4 hours 335 sees max flight operating time than 1 4 hardware. Flight data suggests that (20flights@ 4 Hours: Requ irements SpecifICation (OMRS) hour major flight components, case cyt, aft 122 sec ea .) 
skirt, stiff rings have less than 
designed life due to splashdown 
~.ds . 
23. Mean Time Between Failure 
(MTBF): 
24. Minimize the Number of 
Hazardous Fluid. and Materials 
Used: 
25. Avoid the Use of ToxiC Fluids 
and Mater~I. : 
26. Provide Propulstve Sys. Thai 
Accomodate a Large Thru. t 
Range : 
27. Provide Propulstve Sy •. Thai 
Accomodate a Large Impul.e 
Control Range with Focu. on the 
Minimum Imp/use Side: 
28. Provide Automated Hardware 
Correcttve Action Capability: 
29. Provided well documented 
operations definition for criteria 
data 
Notes or Normalized value lor this 
technology option (Then values 
atV for Criteria 29lnnuence on 
Criteria Factoronfyj 
AQJUSTED' Nonnallzed value for 
th is technology option (Then 
values atV for Criteria 29 Influence 
on Criteria FactoronlyJ 
Source ,. : MSFC S&MA Concept Study 
Support 
OExS Launch VehiCle Siudy 
July 21 , 2004 
Cleaning .olvents, but No special 
prolectlve gannenlS required 
Cleaning . olvents, but not con.ldered 
toxiC 
Thru.1 range Is 65 to 109% 
Not ETO Rocket Engine Focused 
Automated SSME shutdown 
· HPOT IMSL Purge below 170 PStA 
· MCC Pr ... ure (differntlal) Is greater 
than 200 PSIA from Pc (Cak:u~ted) 
Referenu & 400 PSIA during throttling 
· HPOT DI. charge Temp above 1760 · 
· HPFT OlKharge Temp above 1960 ' 
Prior to HI (Cqnftdence Cqnfimed) 
. HPFP Shaft Speed less than 4600 
RPM 
. MCC Pr ... ure below 290 PSIA 
. MCC Pr ... ure not between 610 -
1000 PSIA 
. AFV Position less than 80 % 
· Fuel Prebumer SID Purge Pressure 
sensor above 715 PSIA or above 100 
PSIA later In slart 
. Oxldl;{er Prebumer SID Purge 
Pres.ure sensor above 715 PSIA or 
above 100 PSIA laler In start 
O .. ign ........ menl 
as benign failure 
MTBF'" 769 flights 
(3844 Catutrophlc) 
with SSME Rei of 
.9987 (.999974 
Catastrophic) 
o 
o 
65 1 109% .. ...... % 
range 
NI' 
10 
Not detennlned 
2 Ignite'" and 1 ROFlordnance 
devle .. 
None 
Two fixed points of operation. e.g .• 
throttle prior to MECO and G level 
control 
Nol ETO Rocket Engine Focused 
No Io.fllght redlln!! ' Prior to T-O: MFV 
pos ition Indication »6.5% GG Nnk 
break cqnfimed MCC !gn!!!! firing 
confirmed FTPIQTP discharge 
NI. 
3 10 
0 
571102 
". 
"" 
1.76 
range 
NI' 
• 0.' 
1.69 
1.66 
Source Is : MSFC S&MA Concept 
Study Support 
OExS Launch VehiCle Siudy 
JuPy21 . 2004 
CJunlng solvents. (111. 
Tl1c:hlorelhane . SpWit 126 and 
Reveille) but No special protective 
gannent. required; however, 
Handling malofordance devlcee 
(solid rocket motor) and Pyrotechnic 
Poly Urethane..f'oam applicallon to (3) 
stiffener ring • • ETA ring and PR 855 
Foam In ETA ring 
Thrust range I. nxed (100 1-50% ) by 
design. not operationally controllable 
Impulse range" fixed by design, not 
controKable 
Safe & arm device actuation during 
counidownnaunch abort back to safe 
to control igniter assembly 
O .. ign 
Asse.smenl a. 
Catastrophic 
failure MTBF " 
11348l1lghl. 
with SRM Rei of 
.999912 
2 
NI' 
NI. 
0.34 
10 
10 
10 
3.28 
3.18 
Criteria Discriminators Ref Technology Rl10A4 2.6.5.1.1 Value 
Criteria Saturn J·2 LOAH2 2.6.5.1.37 Value Criteria OEPSS Focused Concepl 2.6.5.7 Value 
Criteria 
(Operational P&W Engine) Factor lOoerational Rocketdvne Enolnel Factor Factor 
Closed CompartmentslConfined Not Rocket Engine Focused NI' Not Rocket Engine Focused NI' Not Rocket EngIne Focused NI' 
2. Numberof Different Operating LH2 , L02, LHe, & GHe 4 LH2, L02, GH2, GHe, & GN2 (ground only) 5 125 LH2, L02, &. GHe 3 0.75 
Fluids Serviced : 
3. Numberof Ground Servicing Preflight LHe conditioning/purge Pre-flight GHe purging 2 2 Preflight GHe purge 
Interlaces : 
LH2 & L02 Tanks, 2 High pressure 
4. Total Number of Tanks In the GHe bottles (purge & valve control), 
• 
L02 & LH2 tanks , and 10 amb, 8 cold He 22 3.67 LH2, L02, 2 GHe 0.67 
Architecture: and T8D HP GHe bottles lor Lox & bottles, and 1 combined GH2/GHe bottle 
4 
LH2 tank pressurization 
LH2 tank & feed·system, L02 tank & feed· 
system, He pneumatic supply IYS, G02 
tank pressurization SYI, GH2 tank 
pressurization sys, POGO suppression 
LH2 tank & feed-system, L02 tank & sys , LH2 recirculation conditioning sys, 
feed-syst&m, 2 He pneumatic supply L02 bleedlHe bubbling conditioning sys, 
sys, L02 tank GHe pressurization sys, Turbine spln-start system, APS Ullage LH2 sys , LOX sys, GHe sys, LH2 
5. Total Number of Vehicle Supplied LH2 tank GHe pressurization sys,GH2 12 
control eng. sys (2) in support of 20 1.67 repress sys, GOX repress sys, 9 0.75 
Support Systems: autogenous bleed pressurization sys, propellant tank fe-pressurization, solid Overboard vent sys (OVS), (2) 28 volt 
TVC sys, 28voh power supply S)'I, rocket ullage control sys (2) In support of electrical s)'s , data sys. 
data sys, Overboard vent sys (OVS), & engine restart , Two 28voh power supply 
propellant utilization (PU) sys. sys, Two 56 VDC inverter to 400 cycle AC 
power supply s)'s, Vehicle C&C sys , TVC 
sys, Instrumentation interface sys, TPS 
heat shield , & hazardous gas detection 
'Y' 
LH2 & L02 leak check connections, LH2 & L02leak check connections, 
6. Total Number of Ground turbopump torque measurement at 
Source is the Design Ref.Doc. ICD's, e.g ., (2) turbopump torque measurement, 
Interface Functions Required : 
Accessory Drive Pad , Chamber throat 8 test ports, nozzle covers, Inspection (4) Chamber throat plug for pressure 8 
plug for pressure checks & solenoid interface points. checks 
valve vent ports (4 valves) . 
7. Total Number of Separate 
Identified Vehicle Systems (lack of Not Rocket Engine Focused NI' Not Rocket Engine Focused NI' Not Rocket EnginelMotor Focused NI' 
d iscipline functional integration): 
Ignition system 28 voh DC power 
supply (2), ignition system diagnostic (S) electrical: (2) 5Vf28V DC Power Bus, (2) (2) prit11ary power connectors &. 
8. Number of Separate (2), ignition system pressure switch 
ElectricallElectronic Interfaces: (2), FPHT, OPHT,FTIT, RPM , Solenoid 23 
Command , (2) Instrumentation Electrical • 02. valve control and (2) Ins!tvmentation 4 0.17 
Connectors connectors 
valves (_ valves), & 9 Instrumentation 
connectors. 
hems In 11'8 plus~10 1 Mach: LH2 valve (13) Mech & (6) EIe: LH2 & LO, feed/ines, 
Inlet, L02 valve inlet, Glmbieblock & LH2 rucirc.line, GH2 &. GO 1 presslines, 
(2) TVC Actuatof"5,lnterstage GHe Supply fines, L02 sys GHe purge sys, 
9. Number of MtlChanlcal Element 
cooldown valve vant port/pump TVC H~ullc Suf:fJly &. Raturn lines, 4 elec1rical connectors and 4 
Mating Operations: 
discharge cooldown valve vent port 33 Prope/~nt valve actuator He Supply lines, 19 0.58 mechanical; L02 &. LH2 feedlines, 8 024 
(OVS), GHe bolckklg purge line, GHe Gimb/ebloclf &. (2) TVC Actuators and GH2 &. G02 repress lines 
pneumatic control supply line, GHe (2)AC &. (2)DC power, (2) CommancIData, 
engine chilldown supply line, & ~ Command only, (4) Ins!tvmentation 
propellant utilization valve. E/ec:triQ1 Connectors 
10. Number of Saflng Operatlons .. t Expendable. however. Reduce HP High pressure bottles (GHe & GH2) must Reduce HP GHe boltles to SO% flight GHe boltles to SO% flight pressure 2 be vented to SO% level before personnel 2 0.' L .. nding: pres.ure 
and s,,'e ord .. nce .ys. exposure 
Engine HandHng . blowdown & EMA Engine Handling, blowdown & EMA 
functional te.ts (Inert Purging), 11. Number of Safety Orillen L imited Pressu~lng pneum .. tlc boltles to , Engine H .. ndling, Inert Purging, 3 0 .• functlonaltest. (Inert Purging). 4 0.8 Access Control Operations: Pressuriz ing HP boltles to Flight V .. lue. Pressurizing pneumatic bottle.!o 
night value ... nd connecting flight v .. lues pyrotechnic. 
12. Number of Commodities used Working with Inert g ...... ln confined Working with Inert gase • • ln confined Worlflng with Inert guu. in confined 
th .. t Require Medical Support .pace • • pyrotechnic., and with • .pace., and with cryogenic. requires 3 0.75 spaces. and with cryogenics 0.75 Operations or Routine Training: cryogenic. require •• pec:laltr .. lnlng. Ipeci .. 1 training. requires special training. 
M .. ln fuel valve. Main Lox valve, (2) ASI Lox 
Supply valve, Gas generator lox .upply 
valve, Gas generator fuelluPPIy valve, 
Fuellnle! Ihutoff valve. oxldlur Inlet Gas generator Oxidizer purge valve. GHe 
.hutoff valve, integrated !urbopump purge valve, Lox dome purge valve, Fuel (2) Main fuel valve. (2Im.1 ln ox v.1lve, (fuel pump, oxidizer pump, turbine, & coolanl.upply valve. Fuel coolant sy.tem 
coolant conlrol valve, fuel ge.1rbox), Intersgge cooldown valve, He purge valve. High pressure turbopump, 011 turbo pump, Igniter 
13. Total Number o f Active pump discharge cooldown valve, 17 Iolllhydraulic turbopump, High pressure 38 224 fuel valve. igniter 011 valve. Sp.1rk I. 0.94 Components : thru. t control valve, m .. ln fuel shutoff tuel turbopump, Pneu valve controls igniter. pneumatic control assembly, 
valve, oxldlz.er flow control v.1lve, supply valve, 2 ASI type ignite,.., Lox AntI- purge .olenold valve, & (4) 
solenoid valves (4), Ignlterlexclter, flod check valve, Mixture Ratio Control turbopump isolation valves 
chllldown pyrovalves (2). and TVC valve, Oxidizer Turbine 8ypall valve, (2) 
gimbal actuator. (2) fuel & Lox flowmeters, (2) fuel & Lox bleed 
valve. , (2) TVC glmb .. 1 actuators, 8 
propellant valve solenoids and 5 check 
valves 
Gearbox, fuel pump, oxidizer pump, 
Intefpropellant seal pack, ma in fuel 
shutoff valve vent cavity , thrust 
contrOl valve body cavity, oxidizer 
GHe vent cavity, injec!orface, 
pneumatic .y.tem control circuit. 
14. Number of Safety Driven Safety oxidizer flow control valve PU valve Hal. gas sy.tem, engine cryo conditioning, 
Functional Requirements to purges. These (blocking) pc.Irgfls are IPS purge, barrier purges, pre-start Develope L02ILH2 with supporting 
Maintain Safe ContrOl of System ",/alive to boost from the ground to \0 purges, MECO purge & POGO 1 0.1 GHe system that controls safety by 0.1 
during Flight and Ground space whe", an etmosphere has 
.uppresslon sys maximizing e passive approach Operations: enough ",t.tJve humidity to f.lcilitate 
H20 uplntJon from the cryo-pumplng 
~used by the ch ln.d and pre-chif~ 
herdwaf'fl. Done by ground systems 
while on Pad end then by on-bQard 
pc.IrgfI tank. Nor required for .scent 
and descent opentJon on Lunar. 
15. Number of Crltlc.1I·1 IC ril-1) Source Is the Desig n Ref . ForCril1 & 
System Functiona l Failure Modes: 1R Hardware lIems TBD TBD Minimum" as possible TBD 
12 Temperature, 16 Pressure, 2 Flow-rate, 
16. Number of Intrusive Data 1 pre.s ure, 1 temp' , & 1 speed sensor 
18 propellant flow control and b leed valve 
" 
\0 Goal Is no Intrusive sensors, bur 0 0.1 Gathering Dev ices: • ensors, & 4 Igniter sensors provide good health coverage . 
Instrumentation 
Source 15 the Design Ref.Doc . Of 
Operations .1nd MaIntenance 
Req uirement. Specifk:atlon IOMRS) 
17. Number of Maintenance Actions N/A . expendable engine; however, TBD, but .see no turnaround 0 Planned Between Missions: ground te. t.uggest none Required maintenance necessary 
as engine has been re. tated 7 time In 
space, but requires the pyrotechniCs 
be replaced before refllght from earth 
Source is the Problem Reporting and NJA • expendable 
engine: however, 18. Number of Maintenance AcUons Correclive AcHon (PRACA) & Planning qualiflCationlest TBD, but see no turnaround 0 Unplanned aetween Missions : and Scheduling Sys (CAPSS) As-run 
experience 
maintenance necessary 
D ... 
suggests 0 actions 
Source Is the Design Ref.Doc. Of 
Operations and Maintenllnce 
Requirements SpecifICation (OMRS), 30 19. Expected Operational Lifetime' N/A· expendable engine ; however, 27 Starts DeSign Requirement: 20 starts & 22SO starts137 0.' TBD Firings : ground tesl demonstrated 19 engine 'K. 50 secs firings@1810slK:ea. Also: 2 f1ighl 
operatlons@920sec. QUAL: 27 
firings @ 3480 sec ea. 
Source is tha Daslgn Ref Doc. Of 
Operations and Ma intenance 
Requ irements SpecifICation (OMRS), 
20. Expected Reuslbl1ity-Humber NJA· expendable engine; however, Design R~ulrement; 20 starts & 22SO 30 ground test demonstrated 19 engine 27 Starts startsJ37 0.' TBD of Firings aefore Over-tiaul: flrings @ 1810 .. cea. Also: 2 flight .... SO secs 
operatlons@920sec. QUAL: 27 
firings @3480 .ec ea. Earth Shelf 
Llfa: l0 years 
None (0) 
for flight 
Source is the Problem Reporting and Nona (0) for flight Source is the Problem Reporting and qualiflOd 21 . EXpcK:ted Reuubl1ity (% HIW Corrective AcUon (PRACA) & Planning quallflOd engine per Correctlva Action (PRACA)& Planning eng ine 0" replacement 0 Replaced per Firing): and Scheduling Sys (CAPSS) As-run 
.. ' D ... Items 19 & 20 above and Scheduling Sys (CAPSS) AS-fun Data Items 19 
&20 
above 
N/A· expendable 
engine ; however. 
ground test 
demonstrated 19 
22. Expocted Operational Llfetime- Source Is the Design Ref.Ooc. Of eng ine firings@ Actual Demonstrated : 111 starts & 20,000 111 Operations and Ma intenance 1810 sec ea. Also: 2 starts120, 02. TBD Hours : Requirements SpeCifICation (OMRS) flight operatlons@ .K. OOOsecs 
920 sec. QUAL: 27 
f.-ings @mOsec 
•.. Ellrth Shelf Life: 
10 years 
Source Is the Problem Reporting and N/A expendable 30 23. Melin Time Between Failure Corrective Action (PRACA) & But: QUAL : 27 Design Requirement: 20 starts & 2250 
starts/37 0.' TBD (MTBF): Operations and Maintenllnce flrings@3480sec .... 50 secs Requirements SpcK:iflCation (OMRS) ... 
24. Minimize the Number of Cleaning sotv.nts, bul No spcK:ial Cleaning solv.nts, but No spcK:1a1 Hazardous Fluids and Mat.rials protecttve garments requ ired; protectiva gannents requ ired 0 0.1 Handing ~Ics and inelf Qases 0 0.1 Used: how.v .... Pyrotechnic valves 
25. Avoid the Use of Toxic Fluids Cleaning solvents , but nol considered 0 Cleaning solvents, but not considered 0 Handling cryogenics and inert gases 0 
and Mlleriais: toxic toxic 
26. Provide Propulsive Sys. That 
Accomodate a large Thrust 
Range: 
27. Provide Propulsive Sys. That 
Accomodate a large Impulse 
Control Range with Focus on the 
Minimum Impluse Side: 
28. Provide Automated Hardware 
Corrective Action Capability : 
Thrust variability for a "fIXed" 
hardware design is tailored using 
Mixture ratio and fuel control for the 
expander cycle Rl10A-4 or Rl10B·2. 
The Rl10E with Electro-rnechanlcal 
(EMA) controls for two vahles 
permitted a thrust range from SO·100% SO · 100'1. or a delta 
without flow path changes. The of SO'l. range 
Rl10A-5 had the EMA's and some 
fIowpath changes for the fuel-slde to 
handle additional bypass flow around 
the turbine and was able to create a 33· 
100'1. variability range. Expander 
cycle Is very flexible in variability. 
see items 26 & 28 
Rl10E derivative of Rl10A eng ine 
with electronic controls demonstrated 
start to min-lhrust, power level check 
and also had a 50'1. throttle to 
maxmum delivered impulse 
capability. The control system design 
appraoch has matured to the level that 
prognostication as well as diagnostics 
for hardware corrective action can be 
performed with an upgrade to an 
e~tronlc control. 
TBD need value 
from Russ J 
o 
Fixed thrust by design H/A 10·100% or 90% range 90% 0.56 
Not ETO Rocket Eng ine Focused H/A Not ETO Rocket Eng ine Focused HI' 
TSD 
Summary Evaluation Product Results and Conclusions 
It can be seen from the tables that follow, that 6 of the 7 candidate technologies 
evaluated would have an improved operational difficulty factor if matured and had a 
good chance of being better than the referenced technology for ETO WBS 2.6.1. 
The operational reliability factor evaluations could be improved for 7 of the 7 
candidate technologies being considered. It is also seen that 5 of the 8 mature candidates 
showed an improved operational reliability factor over the reference technology for ETO 
WBS 2.6.1. This assessment indicates that there is room for improving the operational 
reliability factors using the operational functional criteria discriminators as a guide. 
While reviewing the table below for the WBS 2.6.5 In-space propulsion 
technologies, it can be seen that 6 of the 7 candidate technologies would show an 
improved operational difficulty factor over the reference case if matured. 
The operational reliability factor evaluations could be improved for 7 of the 7 
candidate technologies being considered. It is also seen that 3 of the 6 mature candidates 
showed an improved operational reliability factor over the reference technology for In-
space WBS 2.6.5. Again this assessment indicates that there is room for improving the 
operational reliability factors using the operational functional criteria discriminators as a 
guide. 
In summary this evaluation tool can be used effectively in planning an R&D 
program for improving the operational reliability and its effectiveness for improved 
safety as well as increasing the operability of these propulsion candidates. This product or 
its process should be used in achieving the objecti ves of affordability, supportability, and 
sustainability of future space transportation systems by improving their propulsion 
architectures. 
Evalu ation Product Results for 2.6.1 ETO Chemical Propulsion System 
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defmltion (discriminator 9 9 9 9 data) lor evaluation and 9 3 3 3 9 
34.88 27 22.8 33.01 28.93 27.19 32.73 76.35 49.78 43.6 44.25 37.27 25.1 50.4 27.04 17.57 
Column Normalized Value 1.66 2.53 1.5 Normalized Values are to 1.61 1.6 2.52 
3.18 2.37 2.08 2.21 2.19 1.93 2.65 1.35 1.03 
transfered to the ATLAS TTS) 
definition (discriminator 9 9 9 9 9 3 9 data) lor evaluation and 
25.05 27 22.75 31 .01 26.93 25.19 32.73 48.35 19.78 24.17 24. 25 17.27 23.12 32.4 27.04 8.57 
Column Normalized Value 1.25 Normalized Values are to 2.53 
1.55 1.66 1.68 2.52 2.1 1.1 1.21 1.28 1.08 2.1 1.71 1.35 0.5 
transfered to the ATLAS TTS) 
Evaluation Product Results for 2.6.5 In-Space Chemical Propulsion System 
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definition (discriminator 9 3 3 data) for evaluation and 3 9 9 9 
i 
Column Total Value 27 19.36 23.4 20.6 47.01 42.86 
35.44 22.62 28.73 30.84 25.76 27.89 28.27 21.43 
Column Normalized Value 1.94 1.11 1.08 2.35 2.04 1.77 Normalized Values are to 1.89 2.39 1.54 
1.29 1.33 1.57 1.07 
transfered to the ATLAS TTB) 
a ~I d2!<!.!ment!!!! 
definition (discriminator 9 3 3 data) for evaluation and 3 9 9 9 
i 
Column Tolal Value 
27 22 .36 21 .15 18.78 40.51 30.53 23. 19 22.54 27.3 31.66 15.43 16.64 17.02 22.33 
Column Normalized Val ue 1.86 1.11 
Normalized Values are to 0.99 
1.93 1.61 1.29 1.88 2.73 1.58 0.77 0.79 0.95 1.12 
transfered to the ATLAS TTB) 
The objective of developing a TTB for the ATLAS for the two WBSs of2.6.1 and 
2.6.5 for chemical propulsion was achieved. The following overall assessment of this 
project is included below. 
OPERATIONAL METRICS DEVELOPMENT / DETERMINATION for ATLAS-TIB 
Major observations from process 
• Operational improvements aren ' t always technology constrained, but often driven 
by design choices - Apollo / Saturn vs. Current 
• Traditional process of optimizing for minimum weight at the subsystem, system 
or contractual element level does not provide overall Space Transportation system 
for lowest LCC, Highest Reliability or Highest Safety. 
• Traditional process was developed for achievement of maximum performance, 
e.g., 
• "Design Definition Process" needed to achieve Affordable, Sustainable 
Transportation System must be focus/optimized on major objectives of Lowest 
LCC, High Dependability, High Operability, and Maximum Mission 
Assurance/Safety - Followed by performance assessment & adjustment to 
achieve closure if required. 
• Requirements must be defined around the major objectives above 
• Must maintain focus on these above objectives throughout the entire design and 
operations phases 
If you do what you have always done, you will get what you got before. 
Conceptual definition process must be changed. 
• The requirement of "SUSTAINABLE EXPLORA nON" must be enforced 
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